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Abstract
Redistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes and economic experiments have revealed that  
most people have a preference for redistribution that is not merely inspired by self-interest. Interestingly, little is 
known on how these preferences interact with preferences for different pension schemes. In this paper we review the 
experimental evidence on preferences for redistribution and suggest some links to redistribution through pensions. 
For that  purpose we distinguish between three types of situations.  The first deals with distributional  preferences 
behind a veil of ignorance. In the second type of situation, individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance 
and know their position. Finally, we discuss situations in which income is determined by interdependent rather than  
individual choices. In the closing parts of the paper we discuss whether and how these experimental results speak to  
the redistribution issues of pensions. For example, do they argue for or against mandatory participation? Should we 
have less redistribution and more actuarial fairness? How does this depend on the type of redistribution involved?
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1. Introduction
“A collective pension is always solidary”, according to an advertisement of the world’s biggest pension 
fund  (APB).  Obviously,  the  pension  fund  believes  that  people  value  solidarity  positively.  Broadly 
speaking, solidarity refers to “a positive sense of shared fate between individuals or groups. That is, a  
situation  where  social  relationships  centre  on  the  stronger  helping  the  weaker  or  on  promoting  the 
communal interest” (van der Lecq and Steenbeek, 2007, p. 4). In the domain of pensions, solidarity can 
take place at different levels. A distinction can be made between risk solidarity, subsidizing solidarity and 
income solidarity.  Risk solidarity is a consequence of risk sharing, and it implies that ex post the lucky 
support the unlucky. Subsidizing solidarity involves ex ante value transfers from one group to another—as 
is the case, for example, when longevity risk is expected to be larger for one group (women) than for 
another (men). Income solidarity usually implies that income is redistributed from the rich to the poor—as 
is the case, for instance, for old-age social security (AOW) in the Netherlands (where contributions are 
income-dependent,  while  benefits  are  not).  Whatever  its  form,  however,  solidarity  is  always  about 
redistribution (CPB, 2000). 
An  important  question  is  whether  and  why  people  support  the  redistribution  embodied  in 
collective pension schemes. Some forms of support may be rooted in self-interest (such as redistribution 
resulting from risk solidarity, which is mutually advantageous when people are risk averse). Redistribution 
due to subsidizing- and income solidarity is advantageous for those on the receiving end. Hence, self-
interest can explain these forms of redistribution, if one assumes that the groups who receive have the  
political power to pursue their interests at the expense of those who pay. Apart from the fact that this is a  
tenuous assumption, indeed, an attempt to explain redistribution merely on the basis of self-interest is too 
restricted a perspective. One should not rule out the possibility that many people do in fact have social  
preferences—that is,  a  genuine concern for the welfare of others and a preference for a just  and fair  
distribution of incomes and risks. Increasing numbers of economists (or “even economists”, one could say) 
believe this to be the case. This belief is at  least partly based on  experimental evidence that has been 
collected in the last two decades or so. 
This  paper  reviews  the  experimental  literature  on  social  preferences,  and  discusses  the 
implications for redistribution and pensions. We should mention, however, that few experimental studies 
directly address solidarity with regard to pension schemes. For example, several studies deal with plain  
distribution and redistribution,  but  few of  them focus on such issues  as  subsidizing solidarity  in  risk 
sharing or solidarity across the generations. Still, we believe that the results from this literature can add  
some empirical evidence to pension reform discussions, which are all too often based on mere speculation 
about what people really prefer. Moreover, preferences regarding redistribution are important not only for 
debates  about  pensions,  but  also  for  fiscal  policy  and  the  welfare  state  (including  healthcare,  
unemployment insurance, disability insurance and poverty alleviation). 
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In the experimental literature on “other-regarding” preferences, three different kinds of settings  
(designs)  can  be  distinguished.  Inspired  by  Harsanyi  (1955)  and  Rawls  (1971),  the  first  setting  asks 
individuals to make decisions  behind a veil of ignorance: this prevents them from knowing their own 
income position or even their own abilities. The goal is to assess the principles of distributive justice that  
people uphold when they are largely impartial to the outcome and not affected by their immediate self-
interest. In the second setting, individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance: thus, they know 
whether they occupy a relatively advantaged or disadvantaged position. As a consequence, distributional 
preferences will be affected by self-interest. As we see, however, for many people self-interest is not the  
only  guide  for  their  decisions.  Third,  and  finally,  we  review experiments  in  which  individuals  make 
decisions in strategic settings. The key feature here is that individuals interact with each other and are  
mutually dependent. An important question is whether people are willing and able to cooperate when there  
is tension between individual interest and collective interest. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the 
methodology of experimental economics. Section 3 is the main body of the paper, providing an extensive 
review of the experimental literature that deals with social preferences and redistribution. Section 4 gives a 
summary and our interpretation of the main results. Section 5 outlines the important missing elements in  
the experimental literature with respect to issues of pension solidarity. Finally, Section 6 concludes and 
presents the main implications. 
2. The method of experimental economics
In an economic experiment,  human subjects make decisions in  a controlled environment.  The typical  
procedure is that potential participants (usually students) are invited, by email or otherwise, to take part in 
an experiment that can earn them money. Upon arrival,  subjects are randomly allocated to one of the 
computers in the lab. They receive instructions about the experiment, on screen, on paper or verbally. The  
instructions give details  about  the  “rules  of the  game”.  They explain how a subject’s earnings in  the 
experiment will be affected by his or her own decisions and, possibly, by the decisions of other subjects,  
and  by  chance.  Often  there  is  a  round  of  questions  and  a  practice  round  to  ensure  that  everyone  
understands the rules. Then the experiment starts in earnest, and subjects enter their decisions. Usually, 
they do this individually without convening with other participants. When all decisions are made, subjects  
are privately paid their individual earnings in cash. When all subjects have left, the experiment is over and 
the experimenter can start analyzing the data.
The key issue of any experiment is control. The situation in which the subjects make their choices 
can be precisely controlled and varied by the experimenter. Just like in experimental physics, we do not 
wait for something to happen by accident, but we set up a situation that suits our purposes and observe the  
consequences.  Experiments are used for a variety of purposes.  The most  prominent  use is  testing the 
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predictions of economic models. By their nature, models are an abstraction of the complexities of real life.  
Therefore, field settings always involve a less than perfect match to the assumptions of a theory. In an 
experiment,  the  theoretical  model  and  the  actual  decision  environment  can  be  brought  more  closely 
together. An experiment minimizes the need to make auxiliary assumptions on nuisance variables, and can  
focus on the key variables and mechanisms of interest. The data of the experiment can thus provide a clean  
test of the economic model. This is what is sometimes called ‘testing a theory on its own domain’. A 
related advantage is that it is possible to make ceteris paribus comparisons. One variable can be changed 
at a time, and the consequences observed. Such comparisons are particularly important if one wants or  
needs to make causal inferences (because the observed effects are not flawed by endogeneity, selection  
effects or spuriousness). Experiments can also be used for ‘testbedding’. Just as scale models of airplanes 
are tested in a wind tunnel, one can implement different policies and institutions in a controlled setting to  
examine and compare their performance. Experiments have been used, for example, to evaluate different 
tax systems (see, e.g., Riedl and van Winden, 2007, 2008) and various auction designs for selling spectrum 
rights (for a recent overview of policy-related experiments, see Normann and Ricciuti, 2009).
Another  important  reason for  using experiments  is  that  they  make  it  possible  to  explore  and 
measure behavioral parameters such as risk attitudes, discount rates, probability weighting, or predictive 
abilities  in  an  incentive-compatible  way.  This  paper  is  concerned  with  social  preferences,  which  are 
broadly defined as the manner and degree to which people care about the well-being of others and about 
the aggregate outcome. An important feature of economic experiments is that participants can earn money, 
and that the money they earn depends on their decisions (which is—next to the ‘no deception’ rule—one of 
key differences with most experiments in psychology). This ensures that subjects are motivated to think 
about their decisions carefully and to make decisions that reflect their true preferences. This is particularly  
important for studies of social preferences and pro-social behavior, because in surveys and questionnaire 
studies people may be tempted to give socially desirable answers: “Sure, I would be willing to cooperate”  
and “Of course, I would support the needy”. After all, talk is cheap. In an experiment, however, such social 
responses have material consequences. In other words, participants are forced to put their money where 
their mouth is.
An important question is whether experimental results can be generalized. There are two issues 
related to this question: The concern that laboratory experiments are too simple relative to the environment 
of interest in the outside world (environmental validity) and the concern that the chosen subjects are not  
representative (population validity). With regard to the first concern, it is important to realize that the main 
purpose of an experiment—just  like in a theoretical model—is to identify the essential  environmental  
variables  for  the  research  question  at  hand.  General  theoretical  principles  (self-interest,  rationality, 
maximization, equilibrium) can be and often are tested with rather abstract experimental designs, whereas  
in the case of test-bed experiments, more effort is made to minimize the distance between the experimental 
design and the specific environment of interest.  Moreover, experiments are ideally suited to gradually 
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increase the complexity of the environment (principle of decreasing abstraction). This makes it possible to 
trace precisely which factor is responsible for a particular change in the observed outcomes. 
The second issue of external validity is the choice of experimental subjects (population validity).  
University students are often used as subjects because they are easily available and have relatively low 
opportunity costs.  But the question is whether their behavior is indicative of that of “real people”. To 
investigate this question, researchers have carried out a number of selective replications of experiments 
using  the  relevant  subjects  as  participants  (the  general  population,  voters,  employees,  managers,  for  
example). Even though some differences are found, the results of these studies indicate that the general  
patterns of behavior of “real people” usually correspond remarkably well with those found with student 
subjects. Having said that, it must surely be acknowledged that the experimental method, like any method, 
has  its  limitations.  Experiments  are  no panacea,  but  a  valuable  supplementary source of  information.  
Generally,  one can say that  experimental  results  are  most  convincing when they are  accompanied by 
theoretical insights and observations from the field.
3. Experiments on income distribution and redistribution
To discern the prevalence and shape of people’s distributional preferences, experimental economists make 
use of ‘distribution experiments’. In the experimental set-ups that fall into this category, subjects have to  
choose  among  different  distributions  of  income.  Basically,  a  distinction  can  be  made  between  two 
approaches to elicit the distributional preferences of individuals directly. In the first approach, people make 
decisions about income (re)distribution behind a veil of ignorance: without knowing whether they are in an 
advantaged or disadvantaged (financial) position compared to others. Rawls (1975) denotes this as people 
being in their “original position”. These experiments are discussed in section 3.1. In the second approach, 
subjects make individual  redistribution decisions in  front of  the veil  of  ignorance: knowing their  own 
relative standing. Distribution decisions in this case are not impartial, and a person’s own position can 
influence his or her view on what constitutes a fair distribution. These experiments are discussed in section  
3.2. Finally, section 3.3 covers experiments that deal with strategic interaction: games in which individuals 
are mutually dependent for the achievement of their outcomes. Here, the decisions do not directly reveal 
distributional preferences, but choices may still be guided by social preferences as well as a concern for 
norms of fairness and reciprocity.
3.1. Preferences regarding income distributions: behind a veil of ignorance
This  section  reviews  experiments  investigating  the  principles  of  distributive  justice  to  which  people 
adhere. What preferences do individuals have concerning income distributions when they are not biased by 
self-interest? This matters, because policies that are aligned with generally shared principles are likely to 
be accepted more easily than those that are opposed to them. Principles of justice are hard to assess in the  
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field, for the simple reason that every individual knows his or her position in society (age, gender, skill, 
social background). In particular, people know their position in the income distribution, and can by and 
large predict  their  absolute and relative  future income,  including the risks they face.  This means that  
notions of justice that are expressed by people will  unavoidably be colored by self-interest.  However,  
“objective” justice principles should relate to a situation in which people do not (yet) know their actual 
position, or, alternatively, a situation in which they are impartial to the outcome.
Experiments investigating principles of justice
One of the first such  experimental studies was conducted by  Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey 
(1987), followed up by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990). Their experiments were carried out with the 
aim to implement  the  original  position (i.e.,  behind the veil  of  ignorance)  in  the  laboratory.  In  these 
experiments,  students  formed small  societies  in  which  they  had  to  make  ex-ante  decisions  about  the 
different distributive rules to be implemented in the society that they were going to be part of, without 
knowing what their ex-post absolute and relative income position in this society would be. Specifically, in  
the  experiment  of  Frohlich,  Oppenheimer,  and  Eavey  (1987),  the  participants  had  to  discuss  and 
unanimously  choose  one  of  four  distributive  principles  that  would  be  actually  implemented  after  the 
determination and announcement of each subject’s income position in the society. The four investigated 
distributive principles were as follows: the principle of maximizing the well-being of the worst-off (Rawls, 
1971),  the  principle  of  maximizing  average  well-being  (utilitarian),  and  two  constrained  forms  of 
maximizing  average  well-being.  When  deciding  on  the  distributive  principle,  participants  knew  that 
afterwards they would be randomly allocated to an income class and would earn an amount that depended 
on that income class and the chosen distributive principle. The main result was that, as a rule, virtually all  
participants chose a principle that maximized average income with some lower bound on the minimum 
income  that  the  (ex-post)  worst-off  participant  would  receive.  Hence,  there  was  a  preference  for  a 
utilitarian society with some safety net, where the choice of a safety net could be ascribed to risk aversion  
of the participants. In the follow-up study, Frohlich and Oppenheimer extended that set-up to economies 
with production, and found qualitatively similar results. 
Herne  and Suojanen (2004) investigate  the  behavior  of  participants  for  two different  original 
positions: first, the Rawlsian original position behind the veil of ignorance, and second, the Scanlonian 
original  position,  which  consists  of  negotiating  parties  that  have  full  knowledge  of  their  personal 
characteristics as well as economic and social circumstances, equal bargaining power, and a desire to reach  
agreement that no one could reasonably reject. Interestingly, the authors found that the Rawlsian outcome 
was implemented much more often when there was no veil  of  ignorance (60%) than when there was  
(14%). In line with earlier results, however, the most popular distributive principle (62%) behind a veil of 
ignorance was a utilitarian allocation with a constraint guaranteeing some minimum income for the worst-
off. 
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Distribution choices by a benevolent dictator — vignette studies
Besides  implementing  the original  position,  a  different  way to  generate  impartiality  is  to  ask  
participants to make choices that affect others but not themselves. Hence, participants make choices as an 
impartial referee or—as it is sometimes called—a benevolent dictator. An early example is the study of 
Yaari  and  Bar-Hillel  (1984).  Student  respondents  are  confronted  with  different  scenarios  of  how  to 
distribute a bundle of commodities in a simple exchange economy. Such surveys are sometimes called  
vignette  studies, and  often  do  not  involve  monetary  stakes  (and  in  this  sense  are  not  economic 
experiments). Still, they can generate valuable insights. One of the main interests in this study was under  
what circumstances a departure from the equal division will occur, which is a very natural and widely 
accepted justice norm in situations where the engaged agents are symmetric in all relevant aspects. The  
authors argue that a departure from equal division requires a justification. Accordingly, the investigated 
scenarios are asymmetric with respect to needs or tastes. Subjects are asked how they would allocate 12 
grapefruits (x1) and 12 avocados (x2) over Jones and Smith, when Jones’ utility function is uJ = 100x1 while 
that of Smith is  uS = 20x1 + 20x2. In the scenario in which the utility functions describe the nutritional 
needs of the individuals, the majority of the subjects prefer the allocation (4, 0) for Jones and (8, 12) for  
Smith, yielding equal utilities. However, in the scenario in which the utility functions reflect tastes (liking 
and disliking), the answers are mostly in favor of (12, 0) for Jones and (0, 12) for Smith. 
A main finding of this research is that differences in needs weigh much heavier than differences in  
tastes do as an argument to depart from the equal division. Specifically, in cases of asymmetry in needs, 
the Rawlsian criterion of maximizing the well-being of the worst-off is chosen most often, whereas in  
cases of asymmetry in tastes the utilitarian principle of maximization of the sum (or average) of individual 
utilities is the most popular choice of the uninvolved student respondents. 
Subsequent research using the vignette technique for eliciting principles of distributive justice has  
introduced production into the environment. Schokkaert and Overlaet (1989) compare two scenarios: one 
in which production depends on effort, and one in which production depends on abilities. They find that  
“differences  [in  effort]  completely  overrule  all  other  reasons  for  income  differences”  (p.  31).  Effort 
differences are seen as morally more just arguments for income differences than are differences in innate 
abilities. Schokkaert and Capeau (1991) replicate this finding with respondents from the Flemish working 
population. 
Konow  (1996)  takes  up  these  results  and  formulates  a  theory  of  fairness,  which  tries  to  
characterize the fairness values people share and to isolate these values from situation-specific contexts.  
Specifically, the author proposes what he calls the Accountability Principle as a general rule of fairness. 
This principle basically says that a person’s fair share should vary with the variables he or she can control  
(e.g. work effort) —but not with variables that he or she cannot control (e.g. genetic differences). Konow 
(1996) validates his theory with telephone interviews and written responses to hypothetical scenarios that 
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systematically vary controllable and non-controllable variables. Faravelli  (2007)  investigates  whether 
support for certain principles of distributive justice (egalitarianism, Rawlsian maximin, utilitarianism and 
utilitarianism with a floor constraint) varies with the responsibility that individuals bear for the produced 
outcome. One context was neutral; in a second context, one individual produced less because of a physical 
handicap; in a third context, the individual produced less because of little effort. The fairness judgments 
clearly varied with the  context.  The less  productive individual  is  relatively favored (i.e.  the  maximin 
principle is chosen) if he or she has a handicap, but is relatively disfavored (i.e., the utilitarian principle is  
chosen) if he or she is lazy. 
Distributional choices by a benevolent dictator — experimental economic studies
Undoubtedly, important insights can be gained from vignette studies. However, these studies are  
plagued by the fact that there is no guarantee that respondents indeed report their true preferences, because 
neither their own money, nor that of others, is at stake. For example, there is no guarantee that respondents 
take the task seriously or that they do not give socially desirable responses. For these reasons, researchers  
began using experiments with real monetary incentives. 
In many of these experiments, variations of the so-called dictator game (DG) are implemented (for 
overviews and interpretations, see Camerer, 2003; List, 2004; and Bardsley, 2008). We briefly introduce 
this game here. In its classical form, the dictator game is a two-player game in which one of the players is 
assigned the role of the proposer (the “dictator”), and the other player is the receiver. The proposer is given 
a certain money endowment E (for example, 10 Euro), and decides which fraction s of the endowment he 
or she wants to give to the receiver. The latter has only a passive role; he or she can only accept the gift.1 
At  the  end of  the  game,  the  proposer  earns  (1-s)E, and  the  receiver  earns  sE.  In  the  classic  set-up, 
anonymity is preserved so that neither knows the identity of the other, and the game is played only once so  
that strategic considerations such as reciprocity do not play a role.
Konow (2000)  adopted  the  standard  DG and introduced  the  third-party  DG.  The  experiment 
consists  of  two stages.  In  stage  1,  all  participants  individually generate  earnings  in  a  real-effort  task  
(preparing letters for mailing). Thereafter, participants are matched in pairs, and the sum of their earnings 
is credited to a joint account of the pair. In the second stage in one treatment (‘standard dictator’), one  
subject of the pair is chosen to distribute the earned money between herself and her matched partner; in 
another treatment (‘benevolent dictator’), a third party is chosen for this task. Importantly, the benevolent 
dictator’s earning is independent of the allocation she implements. These two variations of the DG allow 
Konow  (2000)  to  disentangle  ‘true’ distributive  justice  principles  (as  expressed  by  the  uninvolved 
benevolent dictator) from justice ideas that are intermingled with self-interest (as exhibited by the involved 
dictator). In a second treatment variation, Konow (2000) tests whether the support for the Accountability  
1Calling this design a “game” is a bit misleading, since the proposer makes a unilateral decision that cannot be influenced or 
changed by the receiver.
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Principle, as observed in survey studies, carries over to situations in which real money is at stake. This is 
achieved by conducting two different versions of the first stage that differ in the way in which the real-
effort task was rewarded. In the ‘discretionary difference’ treatment, each prepared letter earned the same 
amount of money—and any differences in individual earnings came about through individual differences  
in  productivity  in  letter  preparation.  In  the  ‘exogenous  difference’ treatment,  participants  were  given 
enough time such that everybody could produce the same number of letters. Differences in earning were 
generated by randomly assigning different per-letter rewards to the two players. 
The reported results  clearly support the accountability principle, and also show that  allocation 
decisions when own stakes are involved are indeed strongly influenced by self-regarding concerns. More  
specifically,  in the discretionary difference treatments,  benevolent  dictators  almost  always allocate the 
pair’s joint earnings in proportion to the individuals’ contribution in the real-effort task. In stark contrast,  
in the exogenous productivity difference treatment, benevolent dictators allocate the pair’s joint earnings 
50/50—independent  of  the  differences  in  individual  earnings.  In  fact,  almost  90% of  the  benevolent 
dictators  allocated  exactly  equal  shares.  Standard  dictators  also  take  the  accountability  principle  into 
account, and show a tendency to allocate joint earnings in proportion to individual earnings. However, the  
application  of  the  principle  is  somewhat  biased  toward  the  self-interest  of  the  dictator.  Basically,  all  
deviations  from  proportional  allocations  are  in  the  direction  favoring  the  dictator—and  although 
allocations are significantly related to the discretionary input of the recipient, recipients receive only 30  
cents more for every 100 cents more they contribute to the joint earnings. In the exogenous differences  
treatment, standard dictators allocate 50% or less to the recipient—and when they allocate in proportion to  
the arbitrary per-letter rewards, they do this when it favors them, indicating the effect of material self-
interest. 
Dickinson  and  Tiefenthaler  (2002)  used  a  similar  third-party  dictator  experimental  design  to 
investigate the difference of fairness conceptions when dealing with allocations (inputs) or with outcomes 
(outputs). Whereas Konow (2000) implicitly induced a utility function that is linear in money and the same 
for everybody, these authors induce non-linear utility in money income that differs across participants. An  
important consequence of this variation is that equal allocations do not translate to equal money earnings. 
Similar to the Konow (2000) study, recipient-participants in one treatment earned their rights, while in 
another this was not the case. On aggregate, about 54% of benevolent dictators chose an allocation that  
equalizes  the  outcomes—whereas  only about  4% chose  an  allocation with equal  inputs  (and unequal 
outputs). In addition, about 11% chose an allocation that maximized the joint outcome but led to unequal 
individual outcomes. When comparing the no-earned rights with the earned-rights treatment, Dickinson 
and Tiefenthaler observed a significant shift away from equal outcomes. While in the former case about 
62% of all uninvolved dictators chose allocations that equalize outcomes, this percentage dropped to about  
46% in the latter case. Hence, also in a non-linear (and therefore more complex) environment, equality of 
outcomes and the accountability principle seem to be important. An interesting side result of this study is 
that women seem to be less sensitive to the introduction of earned rights than men. Specifically, in the  
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earned-rights treatment, 58% of women chose allocations equalizing outcomes (compared to only 35% of 
the male participants). 
In  a  recent  paper,  building  upon  Konow  (2000),  Konow,  Saijo  and  Akai  (2009)  empirically 
examine the possible determinants for equity and equality. They specifically investigate if and how the 
relative importance of equity and equality depends on personal characteristics and interpersonal factors. 
In  line  with  earlier  evidence,  the  authors  find  that  in  impersonal  settings  participants  strongly  favor 
outcomes consistent with equity (proportionality). This result is robust to variations in cultural (Japan and 
US) and demographic (age, income, work hours, race, gender) backgrounds of participants. Interestingly, 
however, introducing interpersonal factors and decreasing social distance has significant effects—in that it  
leads  to  shifting allocations  from equity to  equality.  The authors  conclude that  social  preferences  are 
constructed by ‘morals’ and ‘mores’—where the former refers to the moral preferences people have when 
they are in the role of a neutral non-involved arbitrator, and the latter refers to social preferences activated  
by personal considerations.
Distributive justice and earned rights
Redistribution usually does not take place in an idealistic societal vacuum. When pondering just  
distributions, people may take into account the fact that some positions embody some sort of ‘right’ or  
‘claim’. For instance, in discussions about pension reform, some may perceive that people belonging to the 
older generation have the right to receive a certain level of benefits. Such rights and claims are studied by 
Gächter and Riedl (2005, 2006). Pairs of participants acquire asymmetric monetary claims through a real-
effort task. Thereafter, nature decides whether the claims are actually paid out or if the parties have to 
bargain  over  a  smaller  pie—where  it  is  impossible  to  satisfy  both  claims  simultaneously.  The  two 
participants and the impartial third parties are asked for their judgments regarding the just division of the  
reduced  pie.  Importantly,  the  claims  are  economically  sunk.  Nevertheless,  the  vast  majority  of  both  
participants and third parties take these claims into account when formulating their judgment regarding fair  
distribution. Specifically, the distribution proportional to the acquired claims figures prominently in the 
proposed allocations.  In  addition,  some preference for  progressivity  is  observed,  in  that  the  proposed 
distributions become relatively more equal with increasing asymmetries in the claims. 
Chavanne, McCabe and Pia Paganelli (2009) utilize third-party dictator experiments to explore 
redistribution preferences in the presence of entitlements and inequalities. Specifically, in their set-up, one 
of two stakeholders is endowed with money and a third-party dictator can redistribute any portion of this 
endowment to the stakeholder without endowment. Hence, the third party has to actively take money away 
from one  person  to  increase  the  earnings  of  another.  The  authors  investigate  how different  ways  of 
legitimizing the initial endowment alter the benevolent dictator’s redistribution decision. In one pair of 
treatments, the endowed  position is either assigned randomly or through the performance in a test.  In 
another pair of treatments,  the  amount of  endowment was either determined randomly or acquired by 
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working on a word-search task. The authors find that redistribution takes place—but that it depends on the 
way in which the endowed position and the endowment itself are received. Most redistribution takes place 
when the position and the endowment are  randomly assigned.  In this  case,  third parties (on average)  
equalize the earnings of  stakeholders.  When the endowment position or  the  amount of endowment is 
earned, only between 35% and 41% are redistributed to the party without endowment. 
Distributive justice in the face of risk and uncertainty
Despite the prevalence of the risk and uncertainty that accompany everyday life and economic 
activities, all of the surveyed studies on justice principles utilize a deterministic amount of income. Only in 
a recent study by Cappelen et al. (2010) is this issue taken up in the experimental literature. These authors  
investigate fairness views about  risk taking, and examine whether people’s ideas regarding justice focus 
mainly on ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes. The ex ante view (focusing on initial opportunities)  
provides a fairness-based argument for no redistribution of eventual ex post gains and losses. In contrast,  
the  ex  post  view (focusing  on  outcomes)  provides  a  fairness-based  rationale  for  eliminating  ex  post 
inequalities coming from risky decisions. To experimentally investigate fairness views of risk taking, the  
authors implemented a two-stage design. In the first stage, participants had to choose between risky and 
safe alternatives. Participants in the second stage were paired, and earnings resulting from the first-stage 
decisions were pooled. Participants were then informed about choices and outcomes of the risk-taking 
stage, and had to distribute the pooled earnings. In addition, some participants acted as uninvolved third 
parties (spectators) who did not participate in the risk-taking task, and were asked to distribute the pooled 
income between the two involved parties (stakeholders). The authors report the following main results: (i) 
the majority of spectators distribute total earnings equally; however, (ii) many participants did not deem it  
fair to equalize income when there is a difference in risk taking, but found it fair if the difference is in luck; 
(iii) the distribution decisions are independent of the costs of avoiding risk and (iv) choices of spectators  
and stakeholders seem to reflect the same set of fairness considerations.
Summary
Two methods have been used to measure the moral preferences of individuals regarding income 
differences, while controlling for potential biases created by self-interest. One method is to put people 
behind a veil of ignorance. Studies show that people have a preference for maximizing the average income 
in society, subject to a floor constraint. This can interpreted as saying that people are quite willing to trade 
off some equality if this is compensated by extra efficiency. The second method consists of having people 
choose  among income distributions  over  others  as  a  third-party  dictator.  The  results  of  these  studies 
suggest that full income equality is the normative ideal, and that the willingness to deviate from this ideal  
varies systematically with a number of elements in the decision environment.  A major element is  the 
reason that lies behind income inequalities. Many people in their role as third party seem to follow the 
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accountability  principle.  Income  inequalities  that  arise  from factors  beyond  a  person’s  control  (luck,  
disability) should be repaired, while inequalities that are within a person’s control (effort) are tolerated. 
Implementation of the principle, however, also depends on the context. The more ‘social’ the setting and 
the  smaller  the  social  distance,  the  higher  the  relative  weight  put  on  equality  versus  equity 
(proportionality). The relative weight on equality is also higher for women than for men. 
3.2 Preferences regarding income distribution: in front of the veil ignorance
The previous section focused mainly on distribution games in which the allocator is not involved—in the 
sense  that  own  earnings  are  not  at  stake  when  making  the  distribution  decision.  However,  in  most  
circumstances people know their positions, and it is thus likely that some tension exists between self-
serving  and  social  preferences.  For  such  situations,  experiments  again  offer  a  tool  with  which  to 
investigate the effect of different institutional environments in a controlled way. Many experimental set-
ups build on the standard DG, as described in the previous section. 
The standard DG was first implemented by Forsythe et al. (1994). They find that dictators (on 
average) decide to give about $1 of their $5 endowment to the receiver. Dozens of replications indicate  
that this is representative for the outcome of DGs (see Camerer, 2003). Typically, more than 60% of the  
subjects in the role of the proposer choose a positive transfer, with a nontrivial mean transfer of roughly 
20% of the endowment. At the same time, there is considerable heterogeneity among people. There is a  
fraction of dictators (about 35%) who give nothing to the receiver; another fraction (25%) give the receiver  
an equal share, while the rest of the dictators give amounts somewhere between these extremes.
The influence of the size of the stakes 
One variation of the DG was introduced to find out if it matters whether the monetary stakes are 
real or hypothetical. Forsythe et al. (1994) compare dictator decisions for pie sizes of $5 in two treatments.  
In one, the DG was played with real monetary stakes; in the other, the stakes were merely hypothetical.  
They find that the hypothetical decisions were more generous than the real ones, and reject the hypothesis  
that the distributions of proposals are the same in both treatments. Sefton (1992) and Krawczyk and Le  
Lec (2008) find similar results. The latter conclude, “sharing equally in dictator game-like situations may 
be  a  socially-desirable  norm of  behavior,  which however  is  quite  easily  overridden when (sufficient)  
monetary incentives come into play”. 
Is giving behavior sensitive to the  size of the pie to be distributed? Comparing two treatments 
capturing non-hypothetical  decisions,  with stakes of US$5 and US$10, Forsythe et al.  (1994) find no 
significant effect on giving behavior. However, the difference in pie sizes is only US$5. Carpenter et al.  
(2005) implement a larger difference of $90. They find that increasing the stakes from $10 to $100 has no 
statistically significant effect on behavior in the DG. Similarly, List and Cherry (2008) find that raising the 
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stakes from $20 to $100 does not appreciably alter allocation decisions. Hence, it seems that the results 
from dictator games are not an artifact of the relatively small stakes involved. 
The process that generates income and decision power
Do distributional preferences depend on whether the initial endowments are earned or not, and do  
they depend on whether the role of the dictator is earned or randomly assigned? 
Hoffman et al. (1994) report an experiment in which subjects could earn being in the advantaged 
role of the dictator. They first took part in a general knowledge quiz; those with the best performance were  
assigned the role of the dictator. The receivers in the contest entitlement treatment ended up with a much  
lower  payoff  than  those  in  the  control  treatment  applying  the  standard  DG.  Subjects  among  the  top 
performers  obviously  felt  they  had  earned  their  position  and  thus  a  property  right  over  their  initial  
endowment.
Jakiela (2007) reports the results of a comparison between a standard DG and the “taking game”,  
where the dictator’s partner holds the whole endowment in the beginning. He finds that dictators allocate 
themselves a larger share when they themselves are endowed than when their partner is endowed and they 
have to actively take money away. In an additional set of treatments, the standard DG was preceded by a  
piece-rate effort task (sorting dried beans out of a bucket) that determined the subjects’ endowments. The  
author finds that subjects allocate more to themselves when they earn their endowment. Similarly, Oxoby 
and Spraggon (2008) report that in the standard DG dictators allocate on average 20% to the receivers, 
whereas when the dictator had earned the wealth, transfers were close to zero. On the other hand, if the 
receiver had earned the wealth, dictators sometimes even gave more than 50% of the pie to the receiver.  
This suggests that legitimizing of assets creates property rights that participants tend to respect—regardless 
of whether  the powerful  or  the powerless accumulate these rights (see also Ruffle,  1998;  List,  2007;  
Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2008; List and Cherry, 2008; Durante and Putterman, 2009). 
Cappelen et al. (2007) investigate the extent to which the distributive preferences of individuals 
depend on whether the initial  endowment is due to effort or to talent.  Is the earnings-based notion of  
justice as distinctive if high productivity is mainly due to pure talent than if it’s due to the effort that is put  
into production? As in the experiments reviewed before, the distribution phase is preceded by a production 
phase.  However,  in  addition to  the effort  chosen in  the first  phase,  each player’s contribution is  also 
determined by an exogenously given talent. Those with a high rate of return would quadruple their effort  
investment, whereas those with a low rate of return would merely double it. In the distribution phase,  
subjects were paired with another player, were informed about the opponent’s investment, rate of return 
and total contribution, and were then asked to choose a distribution of the total income. The results show 
that subjects take more of the opponent’s production when it is due to a high rate of return (i.e. talent) than 
when it is due to a high investment (i.e., effort).
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Social identity and social distance
Other  factors  that  are  found to affect  distributional  preferences  are  social  identity and  social  
distance. Hoffman et al. (1994) employed a ‘double-blind’ procedure intended to guarantee the complete  
anonymity and social isolation of the individual and his or her decision. Under this procedure, neither the 
receiver, nor the experimenter, nor any subsequent observer of the data could possibly (get to) know the 
subject’s identity. The authors find that under such a strict anonymity setting, a majority of dictators (64 
%) give nothing to the receiver, while in Forsythe et al. (1994) only 35 % give nothing.
Charness and Gneezy (2000) examine the opposite effect of decreasing social distance on giving 
behavior in a DG by comparing behavior in the classic DG approach with a treatment in which participants  
knew the  family  name  of  their  counterparts.  When those  names  were  revealed,  dictators  allocated  a 
significantly larger portion of the pie to the receiver (see also Johannesson and Persson, 2000). Recently,  
Leider et al.  (2009), D’Excelle and Riedl (2009) and Goeree et al.  (2010) investigated dictator giving 
behavior in real existing social networks of Harvard undergraduates, female high school students,  and 
household heads of a village in rural Nicaragua, respectively. The authors mapped the friendship network 
connections as  well  as other social  and economic links (D’Excelle  and Riedl,  2009),  which makes it  
possible to calculate the social distance (geodesic distance) between any two people in the social network. 
Thereafter, people in the investigated networks participated in a series of DGs, with some being dictators  
and  others  receivers.  In  all  three  studies,  dictator  giving  significantly  decreased  with  larger  social 
distances. 
Klor and Shayo (2009) study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. They 
test whether the subject’s in-group sense of well-being affects her preferences over redistribution. Subjects  
belonging to two distinct natural groups were randomly assigned gross incomes, and were informed of  
their own income, the overall mean income and the mean income of each group. Afterwards, they voted 
anonymously over alternative redistributive tax regimes consisting of a linear tax and a lump-sum transfer, 
with the regime being chosen by majority rule. That procedure was repeated 40 times, without feedback 
between rounds and without any interaction between subjects. The authors found that a significant subset  
of  the  subjects  systematically  deviated  from monetary  payoff  maximization  towards  the  tax  rate  that 
benefits their group when the monetary cost of doing so was not too high. They point out that the observed 
deviations cannot be explained by efficiency concerns, inequality aversion, reciprocity, social learning or 
conformity bias.
Gender, age and ideology
As mentioned before, there is a substantial degree of  heterogeneity in social preferences. Some 
background characteristics seem to differentiate those who give more from those who give less. Several 
papers  allude to  the  relationship of  gender  and giving behavior  (for  a  recent  survey,  see  Croson and  
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Gneezy, 2009). Eckel and Grossman (1998) report the results of a double-blind DG designed to permit the 
emergence of basic gender differences in economic behavior. They find that women are more generous 
than men in a high social distance environment. Women, on average, donate twice as much as men to their 
anonymous partners when all confounding factors are eliminated. Bolton and Katoc (1995), in contrast, 
find no gender difference. Cox and Deck (2006) compare behavior across gender in an allocation decision. 
They find that women tend to be more generous than men when social distance is low, monetary cost of 
generosity is low, and when there is an absence of reciprocal motivation (as in the DG).
Apart from the effect of gender, Bellemare et al. (2008) find that older people have a stronger 
preference for income equality than younger people (< 35 years).
Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  ideological  orientations  are  also  strongly  related  to  redistributional 
preferences.  Esarey et  al.  (2009) find that  survey measures of an individual’s  economic ideology can  
predict their preference for redistribution programs that combine income equalization and social insurance. 
In the first stage of their experiment, an individual production task determined each subject’s endowment. 
In the second stage, each individual had the same probability of losing 80% of the endowment. Subjects 
were asked to vote on an income redistribution plan, a tax rate between 0 and 100%, and the median of the  
choices became the effective tax rate for the following periods. Subjects who identified themselves as 
more economically  liberal  voted for  higher  tax rates  than those who reported themselves  to  be more 
economically conservative. Liberals act in accordance with the idea that individuals should be protected 
from bad luck,  while  conservatives  act  in  accordance with the idea that  bad luck is  something to be 
suffered (and good luck something to be enjoyed).
The role of institutions: markets and politics
In most of the experiments reviewed above, the decision maker (dictator) has absolute power over 
the income distribution. The advantage is that these experiments give a very clear and direct view on 
people’s social  preferences.  In reality,  of  course,  distributional  outcomes take shape in  a  much richer 
institutional context—one that can either constrain or facilitate the impact of social preferences. 
Experiments have shown, for example, that market competition can be an important check on the  
role of distributional preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Even if all players on one side of a market  
prefer an equitable outcome, the competition between them might still lead to quite an inequitable result.  
The reason is that an individual player has no control over the outcome, and that coordination is usually 
difficult to achieve. Interestingly, the reverse may also be true. The presence of social preferences can 
nullify the impact of competition on market outcomes (Fehr and Falk, 1999). To illustrate, wage cuts are  
quite rare even in times of high unemployment, because managers fear that employees will compensate  
with less effort and more on-the-job consumption.
 Also political institutions may interact in intricate ways with distributional preferences, as some 
experimental studies have shown. Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) experimentally study the effect of voting 
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on  redistribution.  They  create  poor,  middle  class  and  rich  subjects  by  giving  them  different  initial  
endowments. While classical theory assuming narrow self-interest predicts that only the poor would vote 
for redistribution, the authors find that, next to the poor, also 70% of the middle class and even one-third of 
the rich voted for redistribution from the rich to the poor. Cabrales, Nagel and Rodriguez Mora (2006) find 
the seemingly opposite result: that majority voting does not lead to redistribution. An important difference 
with the previous study, however, is that differences in income are not just random and exogenous, but are  
partly endogenous and determined by the costly effort that individuals exert.  Clearly,  this  reduces the  
willingness of the rich to vote for redistribution. 
3.3 Strategic interaction and redistribution
Often, redistribution also involves a strategic element. Risk sharing, for example, implies that individuals 
agree beforehand that the lucky will support the unlucky. When the risk has materialized, however, the  
lucky  may  have  an  incentive  to  reconsider  the  agreement.  Therefore,  in  the  absence  of  enforceable 
contracts, voluntary risk sharing is akin to a social dilemma. It is in the players’ joint interest that everyone  
cooperates  and  sticks  to  the  agreement,  but  individual  players  may  have  an  incentive  to  defect  and 
renegotiate. Several experiments have examined how people resolve the conflict between joint interest and 
self-interest. Are people willing to cooperate, or do they take a “free ride” whenever they can? Which 
factors determine whether a cooperative outcome is attainable? What does this tell us about people’s social  
preferences?
Risk sharing and insurance games
Selten and Ockenfels (1998) introduced what is called the Solidarity Game. Each of three players 
has a chance of 2/3 to receive an income of 10 DM, and a chance of 1/3 to receive 0 DM. Before the  
players know whether they receive 10 DM or 0 DM, each player is asked how much he or she is willing to 
give to a player who receives 0 DM in the event that he or she receives 10 DM. Are the winners willing to 
compensate the losers, and how does this depend on the number of losers?  The results indicate that 79% 
of the winners are willing to transfer a positive amount to the loser(s). What is remarkable, moreover, is  
that the total amount the winners were willing to transfer (about 3 DM) did not depend on whether there 
were one or two losers. This implies that a single loser would receiver a total transfer of 6 DM (3 DM from 
each winner), leading to a very equitable income distribution (7-7-6)—whereas two losers would each 
receive only 1.5 DM, leading to a very skewed income distribution (7-1.5-1.5).2 
2Interestingly, these results were almost exactly replicated in an experiment conducted with the participants at the Netspar Panel 
conference in which this paper was presented (but before the results by Selten and Ockenfels were presented).
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Charness and Genicot (2007) study a repeated two-player  voluntary risk-sharing game. In each 
period, one of the two players is relatively poor, while the other is relatively rich. Who is poor and who is 
rich is determined randomly in each period. After observing both incomes, each person in a pair chooses a  
non-negative transfer to make to the other person. This part of the game is similar to a DG. One difference 
is that not only the rich but also the poor player can make a transfer. A more important difference is that  
the game is played repeatedly. At the end of each period, there is a certain probability that the game will  
end and a certain probability that the game will continue for at least one more period. At the end of the  
experiment, one period is randomly drawn, and the net incomes of the players in that period determine 
their earnings. Thus, if the players are risk averse, then their ex ante expected utility is maximized when 
they use the transfers to equalize incomes in every period. 
The authors find evidence for risk sharing (without commitment), with higher transfers coming 
from individuals who received the higher income in the period. Moreover, transfers are much higher with a 
higher continuation probability, and they also are highly correlated with the individual’s degree of risk  
aversion. The higher the first transfer made by an individual’s partner, the higher the individual’s eventual 
transfers, which points to reciprocal behavior. The authors also find that beliefs matter with regard to how 
the comparison of actual transfers with expected transfers plays a role in subsequent transfers. They also 
observe that the person with less income in a round often makes a small positive transfer to the other  
person. The authors speculate that such a transfer is seen as a signal of intent. 
In Charness and Genicot (2007) there are no commitment possibilities for risk sharing.  Barr and 
Genicot (2008) vary the level of commitment and information available to individuals when sharing risks. 
Subjects were asked to take part in a gambling game (to choose between gambles varying in average return 
and riskiness) and invited to form risk-sharing groups that pool and share the gains from their gambles 
under different treatments that varied according to the level of exogenous commitment—the ease with 
which individuals  could opt  out  of  their  group or  “defect” after  learning the realization of  their  own 
gamble—and whether the information on such defections was public or private. They find that  limiting the 
exogenously provided commitment is associated with less risk sharing—and so with lower transfers from 
advantaged people. Limiting information on defections can be associated with more risk sharing.
Ben-Ner  et  al.  (2002)  report  the  results  of  a  two-part  DG and  find  evidence  for  reciprocal  
behavior. In their experiments, the recipients in an initial game become dictators in a second game. When  
the subjects  in  a  pair  remain the same,  the  amount  sent  back is  strongly correlated with the  amount 
received—despite the fact that the interaction is anonymous and is known to be one-time and zero-sum in 
nature. When the initial recipient is instead paired with a third subject, a less significant and lower-valued  
correlation between amounts received and sent is exhibited.
Gangadharan and Maitra (2008) implement an insurance game as a multi-period game, where in 
each period subjects in both small and large groups get either a high or a low endowment with equal  
probability (i.e. the endowment in each period is uncertain). They compare the behavior of small groups  
(with  five  members)  with  that  of  large  groups  (with  25  members).  Apart  from individual  level  risk, 
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subjects also experience an aggregate uncertainty with the number of individuals in the group who get a  
high or a low endowment varying from one period to the next depending on a random draw. Subjects can 
fully insure their earnings against individual uncertainty by placing their entire endowment into a group 
account in each period with the total amount in the group account being distributed equally among all 
group members. The structure of the game is similar to a standard linear public goods game with a few 
distinctions: not all subjects get the same endowment, the pattern of endowments received by each agent is  
uncertain, and the per capita return of transferring an additional dollar from the private account to the 
group account is equal to one. The results show that contributions to the pool are significantly higher in 
small  groups compared to large groups.  However,  contribution levels—even in the small  groups—are 
never close to what  the complete risk-sharing equilibrium in this insurance game predicts.  A possible 
explanation is that agents are myopic and fail to fully realize the benefits of contributing to the pool when  
they receive a high endowment. While the long-run benefits of contributing to the pool can be substantial,  
the short-run returns are less so—and more importantly, the short-term returns are lower in large groups.
Overlapping generations and intergenerational transfers
A temporal structure particularly relevant in the domain of pensions and health insurance is that of 
a sequence of  overlapping generations.  For example, in a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system the currently 
retired generation is supported by the currently working generation; when the latter generation retires, they 
will  be  supported  by  the  next  generation  (and  so  on).  Such  a  system  of  intergenerational  transfers,  
however, may suffer from a temporal credibility problem. What is the guarantee that the currently working  
generation  will  receive  the  same  level  of  support  from the  next  generation,  once  they  retire?  Every 
working generation may experience an incentive to reconsider the level of support to the currently old 
generation.  One  behavioral  mechanism  that  could  make  a  PAYG  system  self-enforcing  is  that  of 
intergenerational reciprocity. The present generation receives support in relation to the support they gave to 
the previous generation (Hammond, 1975, Kotlikoff et al., 1988).
Van  der  Heijden  et  al.  (1998a)  use  experiments  to  examine  the  relevance  of  such  cross-
generational  reciprocity  (see  also  Offerman,  Potters  and  Verbon,  2001).  They  employ  a  simple 
overlapping-generations game that abstracts from all complexities that could blur the view on this central  
idea. The game consists of a sequence of players (generations). Each player lives for two periods. In the 
first period, the (young) player has a high income; in the second period, the (old) player has a low income. 
Players  cannot  save,  so  that  efficient  income  smoothing  is  possible  only  through  intergenerational 
transfers. Player (generation) Pt decides on the transfer (pension) Tt to player Pt-1; player Pt+1 decides on the 
transfer Tt+1 to player Pt; player Pt+2 decides on the transfer Tt+2 to player Pt+1, and so on. The experiment 
examines whether there is a positive relationship between Tt+1 and Tt. Is the transfer that a player receives 
from the next player related to the transfer that this player gave to the previous player? Moreover, the 
paper  examines  whether  such  intergenerational  reciprocity  increases  the  viability  of  a  PAYG transfer 
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scheme. For that purpose, two information treatments are implemented. In one treatment, a player knows 
Tt-1 when deciding upon Tt. In the other treatment, a player does not know T t−1 when deciding upon Tt. 
Obviously, the latter treatment rules out any role for monitoring and reciprocity.
The results of  the experiment are clear.  There is  no evidence whatsoever for intergenerational 
reciprocity. The level of the transfer in period t+1 is unrelated to the level of the transfer in period t. Player 
t is neither rewarded nor punished by player t+1 for the way he or she treated player t-1. This result is  
corroborated  by  the  finding  that  the  average  level  of  transfers  is  the  same  in  the  two  information 
treatments. It makes no difference whether or not the previous levels of transfers can be observed. Still, the 
average level of transfers can be considered quite high. The payoffs in the game would be equal to 9  
without transfers (individual rationality), and 25 with optimal transfers (collective rationality). With the 
observed level of transfers, the realized average payoff is 21. So, it might be said that a fairly efficient  
voluntary pension system emerges.  This is  quite remarkable,  in view of  the  fact  that  no commitment 
possibilities  are  available.  A standard game theoretical  analysis  based on purely selfish agents  would  
predict no transfers at all.
Some extensions of this pension game have been studied experimentally. One of these allows for 
private (retirement) savings besides the option to use intergenerational transfers for that purpose (van der  
Heijden et al., 1997). The results show that the possibility of individual savings erodes the support for 
intergenerational  transfers.  This  occurs,  despite  the  fact  that—in  the  experiment—intergenerational 
transfers are more efficient than private savings. The main attraction of private savings in comparison to a  
PAYG system is  that  the  former  suffer  none  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  latter  that  the  system will  be  
maintained to the same degree in the future. 
Güth et al. (2002) study an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple ‘families’ in which 
two types of intergenerational transfers are possible. A generation can make voluntary transfers (St) to the 
previous generation (essentially a PAYG pension to their parents). In addition, a generation can make a  
transfer (Gt) to the next generation (essentially an investment in the human capital and, thus, the earnings 
potential of their children). One of the aims of the experiment is to investigate the relationship between 
St+1 and  St,  as well as the relationship between  St+1 and  Gt. In other words, is a generation (when old) 
rewarded for how it treated its parents and/or for how it treated its children? The experimental results  
suggest that in fact both types of relationships are rather weak. Again, reciprocity—direct or indirect—
does not seem to be a major factor in explaining the support for intergenerational transfers. 
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4. The main lessons
Principles of redistributive justice are utilitarian with a floor constraint 
People share certain principles of redistributive justice when they are behind a veil of ignorance. They are 
willing to trade off some inequality for some efficiency. They neither want to implement the Rawlsian rule 
that makes the potentially worst-off better-off, disregarding efficiency, nor do they want to stick to pure  
utilitarianism (Harsanyi, 1954), which maximizes total utility independent of the distribution of individual  
well-being. Rather, the most preferred rule of justice is utilitarianism combined with a safety net for the  
poorest. In other words, people find it acceptable that some individuals are worse-off—as long as they are 
not too disadvantaged—and if this is compensated by a larger number of other people being better-off. 
People are averse to inequality, but this aversion varies with the source of inequality
In symmetric situations in which people do not differ from each other in important aspects,  the equal 
division or equal sharing norm is prevalent. In asymmetric situations, shared distribution norms seem also 
to exist—even if these norms lead to inequality. People thus seem quite tolerant of inequality under certain 
conditions.  The acceptance of  inequality  strongly depends on the source of  inequality.  Accountability 
(Konow 1996) and equity—in the sense of proportionality—are the leading principles. Income inequalities 
are acceptable when they can be traced back to factors within people’s control—but not if they are the 
result of factors beyond their control. 
Social preferences are relevant even if the veil of ignorance has been lifted
Experiments have shown not only that people share justice ideas when their own material well-being is not 
at stake, but that they care for the well-being of others and for the aggregate outcome even if it comes at  
material cost to themselves. People leave money on the table for anonymous others, even if they could 
easily get away with taking everything. 
Social preferences display a self-serving bias
If people know their own position in society, preferences for redistribution are strongly colored by self-
interest. This is especially important in situations in which people are not symmetric. While people easily 
agree that equality is a good fairness norm when everybody is equal in all of the aspects deemed important, 
people tend to disagree on the fairness norm when they differ with regard to important characteristics. For 
instance, in asymmetric situations, disadvantaged people tend to favor equality, whereas the advantaged 
propagate  proportionality.  Moreover,  individuals  in  an  advantaged  position  typically  have  a  different 
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perspective on accountability than do those in a disadvantaged position. What is deemed to be within or  
beyond a person’s range of control  varies across individuals,  depending on their own interests on the  
matter. This is reminiscent of what psychologists call ‘attribution bias’, according to which people tend to 
claim successes as being due to merit, while explaining failure as a result of bad fortune.
Social preferences depend on the income-generation process
Accountability is not only important for redistributive justice but also shapes preferences for redistribution 
in front of the veil of ignorance. People are much more willing to redistribute income at a personal cost  
when they feel that the recipient deserves it. It is easier to accept redistribution in favor of low-income  
earners whose low income is due to bad luck than when the low income is due to low individual efforts. 
Similarly, redistribution towards less productive people is more easily accepted if the low productivity is  
beyond one’s responsibility. 
Social preferences are heterogeneous
Although social preferences are ubiquitous, not all people reveal social preferences. In addition, those who 
reveal social preferences do show significant variation in how strongly they take the well-being of others 
into account. Much of this observed heterogeneity is still unexplained, but a few personal characteristics 
show significant correlation with expressed social preferences. Women seem to be more generous than 
men, but their generosity is also more sensitive with respect to environmental specifics. Furthermore, older  
people  seem  to  be  more  sensitive  regarding  income  inequalities  than  are  younger  people.  Real  and 
perceived social distance between the persons involved in the redistribution also explains parts of the 
variation in expressed social preferences, with preferences for redistribution increasing with decreasing 
social distance.
Effect of political and economic institutions is ambiguous
Market competition constrains the impact of social preferences on outcomes—but the reverse is also true. 
Whether political institutions constrain or facilitate the impact of social preferences is largely unexplored. 
What existing studies have shown is that political institutions interact with social preferences in a non-
trivial way, and that the specifics of the setting may tip the impact one way or another.
Social preferences are fragile
Social preferences are not only heterogeneous; their expression is also sensitive to institutional specifics  
and to beliefs about the social preferences of others. The willingness to redistribute income is sometimes 
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influenced by economically unimportant details of the decision environment. In addition, generosity and 
cooperation is often conditional—in the sense that it is only expressed if people believe that others are also 
generous and cooperative. This implies an important role for expectations and trust for the support of  
redistribution schemes.
Social preferences across generations
The experimental evidence on altruism and social preferences across generations delivers a clear and to 
some extent surprising picture. There is no evidence for intergenerational reciprocity, in the sense that a 
generation  that  received  support  from  the  previous  generation  is  more  likely  to  support  the  next.  
Subsequent generations supported each other more or less unconditionally. 
5. Perspectives for further experimental research
The experimental evidence we have surveyed convincingly shows that most people take into account their  
own justice principles or the perceived fairness ideas of others when deciding on distributive tasks—be 
these decisions taken in solitary circumstances or taken in situations where they have to interact with  
others.  Pensions  and  social  insurances  are  inherently  (re)distributive,  and  this  evidence  is  therefore  
important  when  one  wishes  to  discuss  individual  and  political  pension  and  insurance  options  in  an 
informed way.  What is largely missing in the experimental  designs is some reflection of the fact  that 
(re)distributional decisions have a time dimension and are prone to risk and uncertainty. These time, risk 
and uncertainty perspectives are particularly important for pensions and social insurance.
Therefore, a first set of research questions may tackle issues regarding principles of justice when 
the consequences take immediate effect (or only with some delay)—and only affect the present generation 
(or also later generations). The surveyed studies have shown that justice principles allow for inequalities if  
they can be linked to circumstances for which a person can be made accountable. If we translate this to the 
pensions problem, then the idea of accountability implies that people may be willing to accept that others  
receive higher  pension payments  if,  for  instance,  this  is  based on higher  productivity  due to  training 
followed —but will be less willing to do so if the higher productivity is based on pure talent or luck. An 
important complicating factor with pensions is that these principles affect not (only) one’s own generation  
but (also) other generations. The sustainability of a pension system based on intergenerational solidarity  
calls for both an extension of justice principles across generations and solidarity between different social  
classes within a generation. Not much is known about the fairness ideas of people in such situations. How 
should the benefits be distributed between different income classes and across generations? Perhaps even 
more important  is  the  question of how the  burden in  times of  distress should be distributed between 
generations and social classes. A similar quandary applies to social insurance, where the benefits and costs 
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have to be distributed between people with different income (potential) and different risks. A first small 
step in analyzing fairness ideas in such contexts was taken by Cappelen et al. (2010) in their study of the  
fairness perceptions of risk-taking. However, many questions remain: What is the fairness perception of  
the trade-off between risk-taking and income? To what extent should a person who deliberately took a high 
risk and earned good income through good luck be made accountable for the good income? Should she be  
treated differently from a person who opted for low risk and had bad luck? These are important questions  
at the heart of any social insurance scheme. 
The  above  briefly  discusses  possible  research  into  the  normative  basis  of  pension  and social 
insurance schemes when people place themselves outside the scheme. In reality, however, people are often 
stakeholders in such schemes. The research on distribution problems clearly indicates that the distribution 
decisions of stakeholders are influenced by the trade-off between fairness and material self-interest.  A  
similar trade-off is to be expected when it comes to decisions about the distribution of benefits and costs  
regarding pension and social insurance schemes. Having established the underlying normative foundations 
in distributional decisions in which the time and risk dimension play an important role, the logical next  
step involves investigating the effect of personal involvement, in the context of seeking to know more  
about  the  sustainability  of  particular  pension  and  social  security  schemes.  Interesting  and  important 
variations and extensions of experimental designs come again from the very nature of pensions and social 
insurance. For instance, self-interest may also influence behavior via historically grown entitlements, a  
phenomenon observed in experimental bargaining and negotiations, but not yet experimentally examined 
in the context of redistribution between different income classes and generations.
In democracies, decisions about the redistributive consequences of pensions and social insurance 
are not implemented dictatorially but via a political process. Therefore, it is important to extend the small  
body of literature on the political economy of (re)distribution to the area of pensions and insurance. In 
future, it will be important to extend this aspect into an inter-generational setting with and without the 
involvement  of  risk  and  uncertainty.  Building  on  experimental  research  into  the  justice  principles  
regarding  (re)distribution  within  and  between  generations,  one  can  design  institutions  that  maximize 
political support for sustaining and/or reforming economically meaningful pension and social insurance 
systems. 
6. Conclusions and implications
This paper surveys the experimental evidence that deals with a major constituent element of solidarity:  
redistribution.  While  the  evidence  clearly  shows that  people  share  some basic  willingness  to  support 
redistribution in general, the evidence also points to the limits to this support, which are influenced by  
various factors such as the source of inequality, social and personal characteristics and the institutional 
environment in which such redistribution takes place. The structure and distributional consequences of 
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solidarity-based pension schemes have to be in line with generally shared fairness norms, and must take 
into account their limits. Otherwise, these schemes will lose societal support, and open to door to a host of  
adverse consequences. 
An  important  message  is  that  inequalities  among  people  with  unequal  characteristics  are 
acceptable  to  a  large  majority  as  long  as  there  are  good  reasons  for  these  inequalities,  and  if  this  
acceptance does not lead to inefficiencies. In particular, the support for redistribution depends crucially on  
the sources of the inequality. One could argue that these distributional preferences reflect the possible 
disincentive effects of full insurance against all income risk, such as the incidence of income insurance on 
effort supply and other moral hazard effects. This requires that individuals bear at least part of the adverse 
consequences  of  their  choices.  It  implies  that  if  one  wants  to  organize  support  for  solidarity  and 
redistribution, it is probably much less effective to emphasize the fact that the recipients need the support 
than it is to stress that they deserve the support. Importantly, such emphasis has to be transparent, because 
social preferences—and therefore support for re-distributional schemes implied in pension systems—have 
been shown to be fragile with respect to perceived injustices. Such transparent policies are also important 
because people’s tendency to apply justice principles in a self-serving way may undermine solidarity when 
there is too much room left for idiosyncratic interpretations. 
It has been suggested that the sustainability of collective pension schemes can be furthered by 
increasing the actuarial fairness and by reducing the (ex ante) redistribution embodied in the system. One 
proposal  is to make contributions dependent  on observable risk characteristics.  Experimental  evidence 
suggests,  however,  that  such  a  proposal  will  probably  not  meet  with  much  popular  support  if  the 
characteristics involved are beyond a person’s control (such as gender or age). There is likely to be much 
more approval if the differentiation is based on characteristics that can be reasonably expected to be due to 
a person’s free choice (such as career decisions and having a partner or not). Generally, one may say that a 
collective pension scheme that reflects proportionality of benefits relative to the provided inputs, and that  
takes into account a person’s accountability for his or her choices, will enjoy relatively strong support from 
the population. There is, however, a caveat to be made.
Although  political  and  ideological  differences  usually  do  not  lead  to  controversies  about  the 
underlying  principles of  fairness  and  justice,  such  controversies  surface  when  it  comes  to  the 
interpretation of  these principles. Both left  and right,  rich and poor, men and women, Europeans and  
Americans  by  and  large  agree  that  people  should  suffer  the  consequences  (and  enjoy  the  fruits)  of 
outcomes for which they can be held accountable. However, as soon as one starts trying to define for what 
precisely people can be held accountable, disagreement starts. For example, some will argue that talents  
and capacities are due to merit and education, or perhaps are a gift from God; others may perceive them as  
merely due to chance. Similarly, the rich may argue that their wealth is due to their own efforts and to the  
risks they have taken during their life, while the poor may claim that their low wealth level is largely due 
to bad luck. However, a number of virtually indisputable characteristics might form a basis upon which 
proportionality and accountability within a pension system could be based. For instance, few people will 
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argue that individuals should be held accountable for their age or their longevity. This may partly explain 
the unfailing support for pension schemes, in general, and for intergenerational solidarity, in particular.
An important  issue uncovered in some of the surveyed research is that  entitlements (or moral 
property rights)  can strongly shape the perception of fair  distributions.  Existing pension systems also 
create such entitlements, which makes it difficult to implement necessary reforms in the face of current  
and future  financial  distress.  The political  conflicts  surrounding efforts  to  increase the retirement  age 
reflect how strongly entitlements can be perceived. Whether or not such entitlements are justified, policies 
targeting reforms that change such entitlements have to take them seriously into account.
Experiments also indicate that the strength of social preferences is decreasing with social distance.  
If people do not feel that others belong to the same group in one way or another, they are less likely to feel  
responsible for their well-being. The support for redistribution via pension systems is crucially dependent 
on a sense of shared identity. This suggests that there is an upper bound on the level and scale at which 
solidarity  and  risk  sharing  can  be  organized.  Even  though  efficiency  and  economies  of  scale  may 
sometimes  dictate  that  risk  pooling  be  organized  at  a  high  level  of  aggregation,  the  support  for  the 
redistribution that such risk sharing entails is likely to decrease at higher levels of aggregation, especially 
in times of hardship.
Finally, we have seen that mutually beneficial voluntary risk sharing does occur—but often fails to 
reach efficient levels, even when the conditions seem relatively favorable. While this failure seems partly  
due to bounded rationality, another important element is lack of trust. This trust is fostered in a number of 
ways. One of these factors is the shadow of the future; another is the absence of outside options. Recent  
developments  on the labor  market,  however,  may erode both of  these factors.  In  particular,  increased 
mobility on the labor market may well erode employees’ sense of identification with their employer and 
with their colleagues—and also decrease the period of time that employees are in the same pension fund. 
From this perspective, it is quite understandable that the support for solidarity is under stress. 
The upshot, in short, is that solidarity must be organized—even when there is broad consensus on 
the underlying principles of fairness and distributive justice. 
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